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Are feelings protected expression?
On September 23, 2020, Netflix released the “Enola Holmes” movie despite being embroiled
in a lawsuit for alleged copyright and trademark infringement brought by the estate of Sir
Arthur Conan Doyle (the author of the Sherlock Holmes novels). 1 “Enola Holmes” is a film
based on a book about the life of Sherlock Holmes’ younger sister. The movie stars actress
Millie Bobby Brown as Enola, and Henry Cavill as Sherlock Holmes. In the complaint, the estate
argues that although most of the Holmes novels are in the public domain, Doyle only began
to give Holmes true human emotion in the last ten stories (which are still protected).2 The
estate claims that this emotion, which is portrayed by the character in the movie, is protected
expression.3
The original complaint was filed in New Mexico federal court in June, 2020, by the Doyle
Estate against Netflix, Legendary Pictures, Penguin Random House, and Nancy Springer,
whose books on Holmes’ remarkable sister form the basis for the Netflix release.4 In 2014,
Judge Posner for the 7th Circuit ruled that Doyle’s stories published before 1923 were in the

public domain, and therefore elements within those works were available for use without a
license.5 However, the court confirmed that Doyle’s stories published in and after 1923 were
still under copyright protection.6 Thus, the Doyle Estate continues to hold copyrights for ten
original stories written between 1923 and 1927, collected in “The Case-Book of Sherlock
Holmes.”7
The estate argues that these stories differ from the rest because tragic events experienced by
the author inspired him to imbue Holmes with emotion.8 The complaint alleges that due to
losing his eldest son in World War I and his brother four months later, Doyle found it “… no
longer enough that Holmes character was the most brilliant and rational mind. Holmes
needed to be human. The character needed to develop human emotion and empathy.” 9 And
that these emotions, unique to the last ten stories, is “. . . at the center . . .” of Springer’s novels
and Netflix’s film – particularly in their initial portrayals of Holmes as cold and detached,
“[t]hen chang[ing] to respond to [Enola] with warmth and kindness.” 10 Essentially, the estate
claims that the Sherlock Holmes character “. . . as a brain without a heart . . .” falls under fair
use but portrayals of him as “. . . a character with a heart[]” infringe upon copyrighted
expression in Doyle’s remaining protected works.11
The estate attempts to establish that Doyle’s expression of Holmes’ emotional ethos is
copyrightable, separately from the series generally and that the depiction of Sherlock in
“Enola Holmes” is derivative of that portrayal.12 In order for Holmes’ feelings to be
copyrighted they must be original forms of creative expression13 and not solely constitute an
idea or a typical element of the genre, which would be prohibited from protection under the
doctrine of scenes-a-faire.14 This doctrine lies within the idea-expression dichotomy, which
restricts copyright protection solely to expressions of ideas within a work and not the ideas
themselves.15
Although infringement can occur by appropriating the plot or scene of a novel without
directly copying the words used,16 it does not seem plausible that a court will find
infringement in this case. The estate does not argue that the film appropriates certain
expressions of Holmes’ feelings specifically found in Doyle’s novels, but simply the idea that a
man devoid of emotion, through the trials and tribulations of life may start to feel something
towards those close to him.17 In Justice Learned Hand’s outline of the abstractions test to
decipher protectable expression from ideas within a work, this would seem to be categorized
more as a “general statement” of an idea18 on which the work is based and a far departure
from the “literal”19 or the expressive substance of the protected novels. Therefore, Holmes’
ability to develop and express emotion would seem to fall more on the idea side, rather than
on the expression side of the spectrum.
Further, the estate alleges that “Enola Holmes” infringes trademark protection of the Holmes
series and brand.20 This may be difficult to prove since the Supreme Court’s decision in Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. disfavored extending trademark protection to works

no longer protected by copyright.21 Further, under the Rogers test, trademark law is only
applied to artistic works if the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the
public interest in free expression.22 It seems likely that the public interest in free expression
will prevail in this case since the film is based on novels that are only tangentially connected
with the Sherlock Holmes series (of which the character appearing in “Enola Holmes” is in the
public domain).
Given the hurdles to proving infringement under copyright or trademark law, it seems unlikely
that the Doyle Estate will recover damages in a court proceeding. However, in 2015, the estate
was successful in obtaining a settlement against Miramax over the “Mr. Holmes” film.23 It may
be the case again that Netflix will settle rather than spend the time and resources to battle
this dispute out in court. Although specific expressions of feelings may be protectable, it
would seem that the general idea of a cold analytical man developing feelings would not be,
especially when the base character has fallen into the public domain and “… become fair
game for follow-on authors.”24
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